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Abstract 
There is growing concern in many developed economies that the benefits of economic growth 
are not shared equitably. This is particularly the case in the UK, where economic growth has 
been geographically uneven and often biased towards already affluent cities. Yet there is relatively 
little evidence on the relationship between growth and poverty in the UK. This paper addresses 
this gap with an analysis of the links between economic growth and poverty in British cities 
between 2000 – 2008. We find little evidence that output growth reduced poverty. While growth 
was associated with wage increases at the top of the distribution, it was not associated with wage 
growth below the median. And there was no relationship between economic growth and the low 
skilled employment rate. These results suggest that growth in this period was far from inclusive. 
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1. Introduction 
There is now increasing concern in many countries that the benefits of economic growth are not 
shared equally (Resolution Foundation et al., 2013; Furman, 2014; OECD, 2014). There has long 
been an assumption that growth would increase incomes across the board and so reduce poverty 
(McCulloch, 2003; Partridge & Rickman, 2008a). This view has been supported by the experience 
of many countries in the global South, which saw strong economic growth alongside significant 
poverty reduction (Dollar, Kleineberg, & Kraay, 2013). It has led urban and regional 
policymakers to attempt to stimulate economic growth on the basis that a “rising tide” will “lift 
all metropolitan boats” (Partridge & Rickman, 2008b: 283). 
 
Yet the recent experience of UK cities does not seem to have born this out. Economic and 
employment growth in the 2000’s was focused on London and cities in the south of the country 
(Champion & Townsend, 2011, 2013; Gardiner et al., 2013). Poverty rates fell in many post-
industrial cities of the North and Midlands (Author 1, 2014). These were often the areas with the 
highest rates of poverty to begin with (Fahmy et al. 2011), but the reduction in poverty across the 
UK was largely due to redistribution rather than wage or employment growth (Brewer, 2012). 
Indeed, poverty actually increased in this period in the most economically successful city of all, 
London (New Policy Institute, 2013). This raises a number of important questions: To what 
extent did urban growth in this period reduce poverty? And was growth associated with rising 
incomes for low wage workers or increasing inequality?  
 
Despite “increasing interest in the spatial distribution of poverty” (Fahmy et al, 2011: 611) in the 
UK, and significant concerns about the growth of disparities between cities, no study – as far as 
we are aware - has directly addressed the question of the relationship between growth, poverty 
and inequality in British cities over the 2000s. This is an important omission for a number of 
reasons. For theory in this area, investigating the links between cities, growth and poverty can 
help illustrate the way the changing economy affects different groups. For policymakers, 
understanding this relationship helps inform attempts to reduce poverty (OECD, 2014). A focus 
on cities is important both for theory and policy: cities are now seen by academics as important 
for economic growth (Storper, 2013); in Great Britain they are also being given new powers and 
responsibilities both to stimulate growth and address poverty (Pike et al., 2012; Lee et al., 2014).  
 
At the same time, there is increasing interest in the notion of inclusive growth: the idea that 
growth alone is not sufficient as a policy target and so the distribution of the benefits also 
matters (Turok, 2010; Summers and Balls, 2015). While the concept was initially used in the 
Global South (e.g. World Bank, 2012), its use has become widespread. For example, the 
European Union now has inclusive growth as an important aim of policy (European 
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Commission, 2014), as do strategies such as the Scottish Government’s economic strategy 
(Scottish Government, 2015). Cities are seen as important in the inclusive growth agenda, and 
the OECD has launched a campaign to encourage cities to develop policies orientated towards 
inclusive growth (OECD, 2016). Yet there is relatively little research on the distributional aspects 
of urban economic growth and what this means for the inclusive growth agenda. 
 
This paper investigates the relationship between economic growth and poverty in British cities 
between 2001 and 2008. There is no consistent time-series of poverty statistics available at the 
sub-regional level in the UK, so we use a novel measure developed by Fenton (2013) which 
proxies poverty through benefits claiming and which correlates very closely to other measures of 
poverty. We also relate economic growth to the employment rate for those with low levels of 
qualifications and different wages percentiles. This allows us to make inferences about the impact 
of growth on in-work poverty, an area of increasing concern in Great Britain (Wills & Linneker, 
2014). Our results suggest that urban economic growth in this period had little impact on poverty 
but contributed to increasing wage inequality. 
 
There is a growing body of evidence investigating the links between growth and poverty at a sub-
national level. Evidence for the global south suggests that, while growth can be positive for the 
incomes of the poor, the relationship depends on context and in particular the spatial and 
sectoral ‘composition of growth’ (Kraay, 2006; Loayza & Raddatz, 2010). Research for developed 
economies suggests a relationship between local employment growth and reduced poverty, 
although the relationship depends on local context (Partridge & Rickman, 2008a). Studies have 
also begun to consider the links between factors associated with growth, such as innovation or 
clusters, and poverty and inequality (Goetz et al., 2011; Breau, Kogler, & Bolton, 2014; Fowler & 
Kleit, 2014; Lee & Rodríguez Pose, 2016). In one of the few UK studies on this topic, 
McCulloch (2003) finds that local employment growth is associated with a higher probability of 
exiting poverty. At the same time, there has also been increasing concern about growing 
inequality nationally (Piketty, 2014) and in cities with strong economies (Bolton & Breau, 2011; 
Lupton et al., 2013; van der Waal & Burgers, 2009).  
 
The paper makes a number of contributions to this literature. Our main contribution is as the 
first study to quantitatively investigate the link between economic growth and poverty in British 
cities. In doing so it also adds a British focus to a developing literature on the links between 
geography and poverty in the US, and extends this literature to focus on output rather than 
employment growth (Fowler & Kleit, 2014; Strait, 2001; Wang, Kleit, Cover, & Fowler, 2011). It 
also extends the literature on uneven development in the UK (Green, 1988; Gardiner et al. 2013), 
by showing the distributional results on growth. Most work in this area has used cross-sectional 
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models which are vulnerable to causality problems, so we use a panel data model and 
instrumental variable (IV) estimators to allay concerns about endogeneity (Partridge, 2005; 
Partridge & Rickman, 2008b; Rupasingha & Goetz, 2011). And it contributes to the developing 
literature on the sub-national dimensions of economic inequality and policy around inclusive 
growth (Florida & Mellander, 2014; Glaeser, Resseger, & Tobio, 2009; Turok, 2010). 
 
The paper is structured as follows. In section two we review the literature on the links between 
economic growth, poverty and inequality at a city level. Section three describes the dataset we use 
to investigate these issues. Section four presents results of panel models of the determinants of 
poverty. To isolate the channels through which growth may be influencing poverty, section five 
considers the relationship between growth and the low-skill labour market. Section six concludes 
and gives potential implications for policy. 
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2. Cities, growth and poverty reduction 
 
Economic growth and poverty in the UK 
There is a general assumption that growth will reduce poverty as the benefits will be shared 
equitably or, at least, trickle down to the less affluent. This is assumption is supported by a 
literature on the experience of developing countries (Dollar et al., 2013; Dollar & Kraay, 2002; 
Ferreira, Leite, & Ravallion, 2010; Kraay, 2006; Loayza & Raddatz, 2010). Focusing on the 
examples of India, China and East Asia, this research has tended to find a positive relationship 
between economic growth and poverty. There is also sub-national research on this topic for 
developing countries. For example, Ferreira et al. (2010) show that output growth reduces 
poverty in a panel of Brazilian states, but that service output growth had a larger effect than 
industry or agriculture. In contrast to this, studies of the developed world in the 2000s were 
highlighting the apparent but contested disconnect between growth and incomes for much of the 
population (Pessoa and Van Reenen, 2013) and the growing problem of inequality in the UK 
(Dorling, 2012). This has led to the concern that relying on growth alone is an ineffective way of 
reducing poverty (OECD, 2014). 
 
There are two primary ways through which growth at city level can reduce poverty: by raising 
wages and/or increasing employment. In standard theory, productivity growth should raise the 
bargaining power of labour and raise wages. Skills shortages may develop, forcing employers to 
increase wages (Houston, 2005). As wages comprise the majority of household incomes, this 
should then reduce poverty. But, while this may happen in some contexts, the link between 
productivity growth and wages may have broken down in the 2000s.  In the US, for example, 
productivity growth in the 2000s led to an increased income share for those at the top of the 
wage distribution, but did not increase median wages (Mishel, Bernstein, & Shierhol, 2009). 
Similar patterns were observed for the UK, with the benefits of increasing productivity going to 
profits and high-earners rather than low-wage workers (Lansley & Reed, 2013). Active labour 
market policy may also have reduced the bargaining power of workers at the lower end of the 
wage distribution, reducing the responsiveness of wages to labour demand. So it is not clear 
whether economic growth in cities would lead to wage growth and so poverty reduction. 
 
The second direct way in which growth may reduce poverty is through employment growth, 
although the extent to which this reduces poverty depends crucially on the scale and type of new 
employment. Employment growth may reduce poverty by drawing people into paid work 
(Partridge & Rickman, 2008b). Increased labour demand may raise wages as other employers 
seek to recruit and retain staff, while increased employment may also provide opportunities for 
workers to move to better paid new jobs (Phimister, Theodossiou, & Upward, 2006). This effect 
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may be particularly pronounced in already tight labour markets, as employers become willing to 
employ workers who would otherwise not be able to find employment (Partridge & Rickman, 
2008b). Because of this, these two factors – wages and employment – can be inter-related, with 
strong growth in one associated with growth in the other. 
 
It may even be that growth focused on high-wage earners may benefit those at risk of poverty 
through localised spillovers. Sassen’s (2001) famous work suggests that affluent knowledge 
workers in global cities may create jobs in personal service work nearby in the local economy. 
Kaplanis (2010a; 2010b) shows that these spillovers operate in British cities more generally, as 
concentrations of degree-educated workers increase wages and employment chances for less well 
educated residents of the same city. Jones and Green (2009) provide evidence of growing 
employment polarization in all UK regions except Northern Ireland which is also consistent with 
this view. However, this might not be enough to reduce poverty. Essletzbichler (2015) shows 
that incomes in US cities with high shares of the 1% most affluent residents are no higher for 
normal residents than elsewhere, once cost of living is taken into account.  
 
There are three important caveats to the view that employment will always reduce poverty. First, 
many of those in employment remain poor. The UK has high rates of in-work poverty (Wills & 
Linneker, 2014). The extent to which employment growth reduces poverty will depend on the 
quality of employment in terms of hours worked and wage levels as well as the quantity of jobs 
(Jones & Green, 2009). Urban job creation is not always in high wage occupations and many 
cities have experienced significant increases in the share of low wage jobs in their labour markets 
(Gordon & Kaplanis, 2014). Second, new employment opportunities must go to groups in-
poverty. The UK has seen increasing polarisation between work-rich and work-poor households 
(Gregg & Wadsworth, 2004). Employment growth will not reduce poverty if new jobs go to 
second earners in non-poor households. Spatial factors will influence this relationship – with 
transport infrastructure and costs providing barriers to employment and limiting the extent to 
which local residents can take new employment opportunities (Partridge & Rickman, 2008b). 
Third, in open urban economies adjustments in labour demand may simply lead to in-commuting 
or in-migration (Gordon and Turok, 2005; Partridge & Rickman, 2008b; Gordon, 2011), 
weakening the relationship between growth and poverty reduction. So the closed economy view 
of growth leading to benefits may be weakened by spatial adjustment mechanisms in porous city 
economies. 
 
Evidence on economic growth and poverty reduction 
One study which considers the relationship between poverty and local labour market conditions 
is McCulloch (2003). Using British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) microdata for the 1990s, he 
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shows that employment growth in a local area is positively associated with the probability of 
leaving poverty and negatively associated with the probability of entering poverty. However, he 
notes that family composition and personal characteristics are far more important predictors of 
poverty than the local labour market. Research on the United States by Partridge and Rickman 
(2008a, 2008b) highlights the potential of employment creation for poverty reduction. In one 
paper (2008b) using cross-sectional regression they show that employment growth reduces 
poverty in US counties. In a second paper (2008a: 305), they also investigate employment growth 
by sector, but while they find “overall employment growth” reduces poverty they find no effect 
from manufacturing or retail specifically, contrary to expectations as these are sectors which are 
expected to employ those at risk of poverty and, in the case of manufacturing, to provide higher 
quality mid-skill employment. To address potential endogeneity challenges in the relationship 
between growth and poverty they use a growth measure calculated based on industry shares in an 
earlier period and subsequent national level growth. 
 
Other studies have begun to relate different aspects of economic development to poverty. For 
example, Fowler & Kleit (2014) link the development of specialised industrial clusters to the 
poverty rate in US counties and find a negative relationship, with clusters reducing poverty even 
when controlling for measures of economic strength such as the unemployment rate. They note, 
however, that longitudinal work would develop their results by better assessing causality. 
Considering the link between innovation processes and the wage distribution in both Europe and 
the United States, Lee and Rodríguez-Pose (2013) find some evidence that innovation increases 
inequality in Europe but not in the United States – the positive relationship is also shown to exist 
in Canada by Breau et al. (2014). They also find that measures of economic growth are in some 
cases associated with reduced wage inequality, perhaps suggesting the gains from growth go to 
the poor. 
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3. The model and data 
 
The model 
To investigate the relationship between growth and poverty we estimate a set of panel data 
models. The basic model assumes that poverty is a function of both the local economy and the 
local population: 
 
Povertyit = α + β1 Growthit + β2 Demographyit + β3 Skillsit + νi + εit   (1) 
 
For city ‘i’ in time ‘t’ where ‘growth’ is one measure of output growth, ‘demography’ is a set of 
controls for the structure of the population and ‘skills’ are their qualifications. The constant is α 
while ν is the time-invariant error and the remaining error is ε. We first consider the simple 
relationship between economic growth and poverty, before introducing controls for other 
demographic and skills related factors.  
 
The challenge in our empirical strategy is that growth and poverty are likely to have a two-way 
relationship, with poverty levels both determined by and a determinant of growth rates. This makes it 
hard to reliably assess if growth has a separate effect in reducing poverty independent from the 
effect of poverty on growth. For example, one way of investigating the growth-poverty 
relationship would be to use a cross-sectional model and see whether, controlling for other 
factors, recent growth was associated with lower poverty. But as poverty may reduce subsequent 
growth rates, any relationship would be unclear because of this two-way relationship. We address 
this challenge in two ways. First, we use a fixed effects specification, where we essentially look at 
whether year-on-year changes in growth are associated with similar changes in the poverty 
(UMBR) rate. The fixed effects remove any time-invariant city level factors, such as the location 
of a city or resource endowments, and so partially addresses these causality concerns. It also 
greatly extends the sample size as we investigate year-on-year variation for the period 2001-2008 
giving a total of 480 observations. But this does not fully solve the problem, as exogenous shocks 
to poverty rates, such as the closure of a local employer, may still have an influence on both 
growth and poverty. Because of this, we also adopt a second approach, an instrumental variable 
model, where we use predicted growth rates which are detached from any year on year 
exogenous shocks to poverty to investigate whether a causal relationship exists. 
 
Cities in Great Britain 
The analysis focuses on British cities, of which there is no standard official definition such as the 
US Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). We focus on the cities included in the State of the 
English Cities Database (SOCD), a comprehensive mapping exercise which identified the largest 
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cities in England (Parkinson et al, 2006). These were defined in a manner closest to an officially 
used functional economic area available. Since then, the cities used have become increasingly 
popular both with policy researchers and academics (see, for example, Lee 2014). As the SOCD 
only includes data for English cities, we also include the largest cities in Scotland and Wales. The 
SOCD is also based on TTWA definitions from the 1991 Census, so we update it to include the 
2001 TTWAs as this is the start of our period of analysis. Because of changes in the TTWAs this 
means we make some minor changes to the sample of cities included.1 Unfortunately, there are a 
large number of missing variables for Northern Ireland so we estimate our models for Britain 
alone. 
 
As the focus of this paper is on labour markets, for each ‘city’ we use the 2001 Travel to Work 
Areas (TTWAs) as the boundaries for the city. TTWAs are a measure of labour market 
functionality based on areas where at least three quarters of those living in the TTWA also work 
there. Full details on TTWAs in Britain can be found in Coombes and Bond (2008). However, as 
many of the control variables we use are only available at a local authority level, we follow 
Kaplanis (2010b) and define TTWAs as being composed of their constituent local authorities – 
adapting his approach so that each local authority is allocated into a single TTWA.2 This gives us 
a panel of cities with consistent boundaries over the period. The final sample is 60 cities for 8 
years, giving a total of 480 observations. 
 
Defining poverty 
There are a number of different definitions of poverty and ways of measuring it (see Fahmy et al. 
2011 or Cribb et al. 2013). Official poverty estimates in the UK draw largely on two measures. 
The first is relative poverty, a measure of the number of households with income of less than 60 
per cent of the national median, adjusted for household size. A second measure, absolute 
poverty, measures incomes against a fixed-year. National level poverty estimates are derived from 
                                                        
1In Parkinson et al. 2006 older TTWA boundaries are used so we update these and add the major Scottish 
and Welsh cities. Additions from the SOCD are highlighted with a * and changes noted in parenthesis. 
Our final list of TTWAs is: Aberdeen*; Barnsley; Birmingham; Blackburn; Blackpool; Bolton; 
Bournemouth; Bradford; Brighton; Bristol; Burnley, Nelson and Colne (replacing Burnley); Cambridge; 
Cardiff; Coventry; Crawley; Derby; Doncaster; Edinburgh*; Glasgow*; Gloucester; Grimsby; Guildford 
and Aldershot (replacing Aldershot); Hastings; Huddersfield; Hull; Ipswich; Leeds; Leicester; Liverpool; 
London; Luton and Watford; Maidstone and North Kent (replacing Chatham); Manchester; Mansfield; 
Middlesbrough and Stockton (replacing Middlesbrough); Milton Keynes and Aylesbury (replacing Milton 
Keynes); Newcastle and Durham (replacing Newcastle); Northampton and Wellingborough (replacing 
Northampton); Norwich; Nottingham; Oxford; Peterborough; Plymouth; Portsmouth; Preston; Reading 
and Bracknell; Rochdale and Oldham; Sheffield and Rotherham (replacing Sheffield); Southampton; 
Southend and Brentwood (replacing Southend); Stoke; Sunderland; Swansea Bay*; Swindon; Telford and 
Bridgnorth; Wakefield and Castleford; Warrington and Wigan (replacing Warrington and Wigan); Wirral 
and Ellesmere Port (replacing Birkenhead); Worthing; York.  
2 See also Nathan (2010) or Lee (2014) for similar applications of these approaches. 
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survey data collected annually by the Family Resources Survey (FRS). The FRS can also be used 
to derive regional estimates. However, because of the sampling method and size, the FRS cannot 
be used to derive estimates at a city or local level. Local measures which attempt to estimate the 
level of poverty have therefore typically used administrative benefits data as a proxy. The 
measures adopted here build on and extend this type of approach. 
 
Our measure of poverty is the Unadjusted Means-Tested Benefits Rate (UMBR)3 which 
represents an annual average of the proportion of households which claim a number of major 
means-tested out-of-work benefits (Jobseeker’s Allowance, Income Support, Pension Credit 
[since 2003]4, and Employment and Support Allowance [since 2008]).5 This builds on the work 
carried out by Fenton and Lupton (see Fenton, 2013; Lupton et al, 2013). 
 
UMBR is closely related to other measures of poverty. It is also strongly correlated to wider 
measures of area deprivation (Gambaro et al., 2014). The extent to which UMBR effectively 
proxies for income poverty can be gauged by testing the measure’s coverage and validity against 
national estimates from the FRS which contain both income and benefits information (see 
Fenton, 2013). The validity is the proportion of households captured by each UMBR who are 
also in income poverty. The coverage is the proportion of all poor households identified by the 
measure. The estimates of validity are 47 and 62 per cent respectively for poverty measures using 
60 and 70 per cent of median income after housing costs. The coverage is lower, at 30 per cent, 
although underreporting of benefits data is known to be an issue in surveys such as the FRS so 
this figure is likely to be an underestimate (Fenton, 2013). 
 
Tests on the UMBR data for different years at the national and regional level show that a lower 
UMBR rate is strongly associated with a lower incidence of income poverty (although the precise 
relationship with income poverty is subject to modest fluctuations over the period, for full details 
see Fenton, 2013). The UMBR estimates also correlate strongly with local poverty estimates 
previously made by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) for a single year only, 2007-2008 (see 
Fry, 2010). Previous analysis has also shown UMBR to be closely correlated to Housing Benefit 
receipt at a city level (a benefit available to low-income renters whether they are in or out of 
work) (Author 1, 2014). UMBR’s main weakness is the lack of coverage of those in-work and in-
poverty, and this is a growing component of poverty in the UK.  
                                                        
3 It is ‘unadjusted’ in the sense that the raw rate is used and potential spatial differences in validity and 
coverage cannot be estimated.  
4 Note that tests suggest that the inclusion of pension credit does not significantly impact on our results. 
The inclusion of Employment and Support Allowance, which was phased in, has a very small effect on the 
2008 figures (of less than 0.40 per cent in each city). 
5 Note that testing with different combinations of benefits or time periods makes little difference to the 
core results. 
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UMBR represents a novel way of assessing local poverty rates and provides a reasonable proxy, 
but as with all such indicators there are some potential limitations. The central issue, given the 
nature of the results we present, is whether it is likely that UMBR underestimates poverty change 
in relation to growth vis-à-vis income based estimates. We have run a number of sensitivity 
checks to assess this. Our indicator is closely correlated in a panel regression model with an 
alternative measure of poverty, Housing Benefit receipt (a benefit available to low-income renters 
whether they are in or out of work).6 We also triangulate the use of UMBR with other measures 
of worker pay and employment rates of low-skilled workers (as described later in this paper).  
 
In the UK, around half of all people leaving poverty do so because their earnings increase rather 
than because they enter employment (DWP, 2010). Because UMBR is partly calculated using out-
of-work benefits this might bias our results. However, most poverty transitions are short-term 
mobility around the poverty line rather than long-term exits from poverty (as Hills, 2014, sets out 
incomes for low-earners can be very variable from one year to the next). We would also expect 
employment growth and wage growth for low earners to be highly related. Moreover, our wage 
estimations do not support the idea of a significant growth premium experienced by low-paid 
workers over the period of analysis. Our analysis of the employment rate of low-skilled workers 
is also consistent with the UMBR results and this interpretation. These findings support our 
confidence in the robustness of the results presented.  
 
Insert figure 1 around here 
 
This measure gives an indicator of the cities with the highest rates of poverty in the UK. The 
cities with the highest rate of poverty in 2001 were Liverpool (36%), Glasgow (33%), Sunderland 
(30%), Newcastle (29%) and Middlesborough and Stockton (29%). These tend to be relatively 
large cities which had experienced post-industrial decline.  The data can also show which cities 
has experienced reductions in poverty, and we document a convergence of poverty rates in the 
UK over this period as these high-poverty cities experienced the largest reductions. Figure 1 
shows this general pattern, with a clear, albeit far from perfect, relationship between poverty and 
poverty change. Indeed, the cities with the largest falls were in Glasgow (-3.1%), Liverpool (-
2.6%), Newcastle (-2.5%). 
 
Measures of economic growth 
There are several ways of defining ‘growth’. One division is between growth in ‘labour 
productivity’ - the amount produced per worker – and growth in the total size of the urban 
                                                        
6 Note that, due to data availability data from 2003 – 2008 is used to test this. 
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economy. In some circumstances, labour productivity may decline as employment increases, if 
new employment is in low-productivity sectors  – a situation experienced in the UK following 
the 2008 financial crisis (Dolphin and Hatfield, 2015). Similarly, if growth is associated with in-
migration it might be that output per capita declines even as the size of the economy increases. 
While cross-national work has tended to use indicators of output as a growth indicator, national 
studies have focused on employment growth.  
 
The focus of our investigation into economic growth is Gross Value Added (GVA). GVA is 
published at the NUTs 3 level in Britain – a relatively small unit indicator of GVA, but one 
which does not map directly on to our definitions of ‘cities’. To address this problem we use the 
following approach to allocation: first, we calculate GVA per worker for each sector in the 
NUTS3 region; next, we establish the number of workers in each TTWA and assume they have 
the average productivity of workers in their sector / NUTS3 combination (as workers in the 
same TTWA may be in different NUTS3 regions); finally, we aggregate to overall TTWA GVA 
measures. For example, assume we have a NUTS2 area which consists of two local authorities, 
but where each local authority is in a different TTWA. Considering just manufacturing, each 
manufacturing worker in the each local authority is given the average productivity of 
manufacturing workers in the NUTS area; each manufacturing worker is then allocated to the 
TTWA based on their local authority. The output from all manufacturing workers in each TTWA 
can then be summed to create total and per capita figures. This means that sectoral productivity 
is still calculated at a relatively local level, but with some relatively minor adjustments to translate 
it to the TTWA area. Given the limitations of any local level indicator of GVA, this methodology 
provides the best approximation at a TTWA level. While there will be issues with identification at 
a local level, our focus on the 60 largest cities should minimize these problems.  
 
We include three measure of the growth rate of GVA: (1) the percentage growth rate of GVA 
per capita, (2) the percentage growth rate of GVA per worker and, (3) the percentage total GVA 
growth rate as might be used in the national accounts. The growth rate of per capita GVA will 
give a measure of economic growth closest to those related to national income, but will be 
affected by changes in the non-working population. GVA per worker is a measure of 
productivity. Total GVA gives an overall measure of the size of the urban economy. In addition 
to including these rates, we include two measures in levels. These are (4) the log of GVA per 
capita (ln) and (5) the log of GVA per worker. These are included as growth rates may be skewed 
by lower initial values, and so including values in levels allows us to investigate whether absolute 
levels of economic development matter. All per capita measures only include the population aged 
16 and above. 
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The results of this exercise show a relatively familiar pattern to observers of UK urban change. 
Considering annual average growth rates in GVA per worker in the period 2001-2008, the cities 
which experienced the fastest growth were London (5.1%), Milton Keynes (5%) Edinburgh 
(5%), Reading (4.8%) and Ipswich (4.7%), cities which tended to focus on the finance and 
business services industries which were growing in this period. In contrast, the slowest rates were 
in Wakefield (1.8%), Coventry (2.5%), Swansea (2.5%), Barnsley (2.8%) and Sunderland (2.8%). 
Our results reflect the growing North-South divide in the period, but also show a more local 
pattern of slow growth in Wales and the Midlands. However, there was no correlation between 
this indicator of economic growth and poverty reduction. A simple pairwise correlation 
coefficient between the indicator of GVA per worker increase over 2001 - 2008 and the poverty 
change outlined above is 0.1221 and not close to statistical significance. This simple test provides 
the first evidence that growth may not have been poverty reducing. 
 
Control variables 
We control for a series of variables, each of which may have a significant influence on poverty. 
Past research has shown that personal and family characteristics are the most important 
determinants of poverty, so we focus our control variables on demographic factors (McCulluch, 
2003). Moreover, we face a challenge as many local characteristics such as sector are likely to be 
closely related or endogenous with growth. Variables are all calculated as annual averages from 
the Labour Force Survey (LFS). Descriptive statistics are given in table 1. 
 
Insert table 1 around here 
 
We control for demographic structure with three variables: the share of lone parents, females and 
those under 16 in the population. Single-parenthood reduces the incentives to work, as childcare 
consumes a significant proportion of earnings and caring arrangements may become harder 
(Stewart, 2014). We expect the share of lone parents to be positively associated with poverty. 
 
Women are also more at risk of poverty than males in the UK. Wages are lower for females, who 
are at a greater risk of in-work poverty (Stewart, 2014). Gender discrimination in the labour 
market can lead to lower wages and there is still an earning and unemployment penalty associated 
with motherhood. Yet, as we also control individually for these effects the relationship between 
poverty and the share of women in the area is ambiguous. 
 
The third demographic variable is the share of the population aged under 16. This is essentially a 
proxy for parenthood. Where there are more children in the local area, this is likely to increase 
poverty rates as they are strongly related to household size. 
 14 
 
We also control for two other sets of population characteristics. Most importantly, we control for 
the skills of the population. As is common in empirical work, we proxy the notion of ‘skills’ 
through a measure of education: the share of degree holders in the TTWA. Better educated 
workers are less likely to be unemployed and more likely to earn high wages. There may also be 
spillovers from high-skilled workers to wages and employment for low skilled workers (Kaplanis, 
2010a; 2010b) Because of this, we expect the share of workers with degrees to be negatively 
associated with poverty. 
 
A control for international migration is also used – the share of the population born overseas. 
The effect here may be unclear as some migrant groups are less likely to be successful in the 
labour market, yet others perform better than the native population. 
 
In all regressions we include a set of year fixed effects. These are intended to capture cyclical 
changes in the national economy and other changes which will impact on the poverty rate. The 
final year of our data includes the year the UK entered recession. Investigation of changing 
poverty rates over this period suggest that the largest changes in poverty were only in the latter 
year. Moreover, any cyclical variation should be captured with the year fixed effects.   
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4. Economic growth and poverty: Regression results 
 
Panel data regressions 
We first consider the direct relationship between economic growth and the UMBR measure of 
poverty. Table 2 presents the results of the regression models linking urban economic growth 
and poverty rates in British cities. Regressions 1 – 5 include year dummies but not controls. The 
models are estimated as fixed effects panel regression models, so control for time-invariant city-
specific factors such as regional location. Considering first the three growth rate measures 
(columns 1 – 3), only one of these – productivity growth, measured as GVA per worker – is 
negatively and statistically significant, indicating that growth may reduce poverty, albeit without 
controls. Of the two measures for overall development levels (columns 4 and 5), change in GVA 
per capita is not significant. However, total GVA is statistically significant and positive – 
indicating positive change in GVA per worker is actually associated with an increase in the share 
of those in poverty.  Overall, these suggest that any relationship between growth and poverty is 
weak at best. 
 
Insert table 2 around here 
 
In columns 6 – 10 we include the full set of controls. Only one of the five measures of growth or 
economic development is statistically significant, and this – Total GVA growth rate – is only at 
the 10% level. However, controlling for other demographic factors and the skills of the 
workforce the results suggest no consistent relationship between growth and poverty in this 
period. In contrast to the dominant narrative of ‘trickle-down’ growth, the benefits of growth 
were not reaching those in poverty in this period. 
 
This result is clear from the experience of some cities in the sample. London, for example, saw 
strong economic growth in the period, yet its poverty reduction performance was mediocre 
(Cunliffe et al., 2013). In contrast, there was above-average poverty reduction by the UMBR 
measure in a city like Barnsley, yet the growth performance of the city was mediocre. Rather than 
a simple case of growth reducing poverty, the relationship seemed to be more complicated and 
driven by local factors. 
 
The control variables show that while economic growth is only loosely related with poverty, 
demographic factors do matter. Two demographic variables – the share of the population aged 
under 16 and the share who are female – are positively associated with poverty, in line with other 
evidence that female headed households and those with children are more likely to be poor. The 
share of lone parents did not, in contrast to expectations, seem to impact on the poverty rate. 
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Neither did the share of the population with degree. One explanation for this is that over this 
period the public sector, which is relatively graduate intensive, was expanding, and the share of 
degree holders in many cities was increasing on the basis of this, rather than for other economic 
reasons. Migration was also unimportant, perhaps reflecting the polarised nature of migrants in 
Britain who suffer from lower employment rates than natives but are more polarised into higher- 
and lower-qualified groups (Dustmann & Frattini, 2011).  
 
Instrumental variable analysis 
One problem in this model is the possibility of endogeneity and, more specifically, simultaneity 
between growth and poverty. This may bias the relationship between growth and poverty if, for 
example, high levels of poverty in t0 reduces economic growth in t1. This is entirely feasible as 
high levels of poverty may reduce consumer demand and so hinder local economic growth. 
Alternatively, however, the causality may be reversed: poverty may be reflected in lower prices 
for land and labour and this will then attract new employment, meaning higher economic growth. 
The problem is that this potential two-way relationship is not controlled for in the fixed effects 
model and it might bias the coefficient on the growth variable and mean that we cannot be 
confident that the observed relationship is correct. 
 
Our solution is an instrumental variable (IV) approach. This requires an IV which is correlated to 
economic growth but has no theoretical link to changes in poverty. Following a common 
approach in the migration literature, we use a shift-share approach (see Ottaviano and Peri 2005 
for a similar application). We take the initial share of output by sector in the city in 1998 and 
assume that each sector then grows at the actual national trend over the subsequent 10 years. The 
result should be correlated with economic growth but independent of changes in poverty over 
this period. This is a similar instrument to that used by Partridge and Rickman (2008a). 
Essentially, this is a check against two potential problems: (a) economic growth inducing in flows 
of people at risk of poverty or (b) that poverty serves as a short-term drag on subsequent growth 
rates. Both of these would bias down the coefficient on the growth variable, so we need an 
exogenous variable to test whether the result is robust. 
 
Insert table 3 around here 
 
Table 3 gives the results of the analysis. F-tests and first stage results suggest that this is not a 
weak instrument and the magnitude of the coefficients is similar to that in the previous results. 
But in no case do they suggest that there is a statistically significant relationship between 
economic growth and poverty. These results support our previous interpretation that there was 
little relationship between economic growth and poverty reduction. One issue is there is only a 
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short time period between the base year of the instrument and the years included in the 
regression. We also experiment using a longer gap between the base year of the instrument and 
the years in the regression and this does not significantly change the results.  
 
In short, output growth seems to have little relationship with poverty over the period we study. 
However, the composition of the population did matter, according with McCulloch’s (2003) 
finding that personal characteristics are more important than local labour market strength. It also 
supports the pessimistic national narrative about the disconnect between growth and living 
standards (Resolution Foundation, 2013). But focusing purely on poverty may ignore two 
significant forms of variation. First, employment may actually be increasing. Second, wages may 
be increasing for other groups in the labour market – the question of who gains from growth 
remains important. We next consider these two issues.  
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5. Growth and the labour market 
 
The impact on poverty at a city level may happen in several ways, but the most direct channels 
are through employment creation and/or increased wages, so the primary channel through which 
economic growth will impact on poverty is through the labour market. To test our results in table 
3, we then assess first the extent to which economic growth is effectively drawing workers at risk 
of poverty into employment before considering how wages at different percentiles are affected 
by growth. We use a similar empirical framework to that in equation 1, but with different 
dependent variables, to test the relationship between growth and both low skilled employment 
rates and the wage distribution. 
 
Economic growth and the low skilled labour market 
For growth to be inclusive, it should improve outcomes for those who are most at risk of 
poverty. So an important question is the extent to which growth is increasing employment rates 
for those at risk of poverty. As low skill levels are one of the most significant risk factors, table 4 
repeats the previous analysis with a new dependent variable: the employment rate for those with 
qualifications equivalent to National Vocational Qualification (NVQ) level 2 or below (these are 
equivalent to high school leaving examination results at grade A-C). 
 
Insert table 4 around here 
 
The results are presented in table 4. Overall, they suggest that economic growth in this period 
had little impact on the low skilled employment rate. There is one exception – an association at 
the 10% statistical significance level with total GVA growth. This overall lack of results is not 
necessarily surprising. First, this was a period in which economic change was biased against low 
skilled groups. It may be that any growth effects were simply too small relative to the changing 
structural characteristics of the labour market.  Second, growth in the 2000s was heavily 
unbalanced across Britain, with the strongest growth in London and other cities in the south of 
England. These cities had tight labour markets and unemployment was not due to weak labour 
demand. Those out of work faced other barriers to participation (such as caring issues) rather 
than a lack of employment opportunities (Gordon & Turok, 2005). Finally, at the same time the 
government was focused on increasing employment rates for workers regardless of location 
(Adam and Green, 2016). So it might be that active labour market policies were increasing 
employment rates nationally and, because the cities which were experiencing slower growth had 
more unemployed, this national level policy was reducing the importance of local growth as a 
tool to increase low skilled employment rates. However, in this latter case we might expect wages 
 19 
to have increased at the lower end of the distribution, as increased demand in the context of a 
tight labour market fed through into wages.  
 
Economic growth and wage growth 
We next consider which parts of the wage distribution gain from growth to assess whether 
growth benefits higher or lower earners. If growth had simply increased wage inequality, this 
would show up in an association with growth at the top but not the bottom of the distribution. 
To test this, we estimate the model from table 3 but our dependent variables are different 
percentiles of the wage distribution without controls. We test the 10th and 20th percentiles to give 
an indicator of the low-wage labour market, the median, and the 80th and 90th percentiles which 
are the high-wage labour market. We do not assume that this is a causal relationship, but present 
these as descriptive statistics to investigate associations. If the results of growth were evenly 
shared over this period, we would expect economic growth to have been associated with wage 
growth at all points of the distribution. 
 
Insert table 5 around here 
 
The results are given in table 5. The results strongly show that output growth is associated with 
the upper part of the wage distribution. The first panel considers the growth rate of GVA per 
capita: in both cases, there are positive and significant relationships with the 80th and 90th 
percentiles of the wage distribution but no other percentiles. The second indicator, growth in 
GVA per worker, is also statistically significantly related to the median wage and with the 10th 
percentile, although this latter result is only statistically significant at the 10% level (and may well 
be driven by selection effects, as if low wage workers are out of the labour market this will 
increase both the 10th wage percentile and GVA per worker). The third indicator, the growth rate 
of GVA per capita, is only associated with growth at the 80th and 90th percentiles. The results are 
very similar when considering the two indicators included as levels, rather than growth rates, with 
both GVA per capita and GVA per worker associated with the 80th and 90th percentiles. GVA 
per worker is also associated with the median wage, but only at the 10% significance level.  
 
In short, there is little relationship between growth and low wage percentiles but a consistent and 
statistically significant relationship above the median. The period of our analysis saw significant 
economic change which often held down wages at the bottom of the wage distribution, such as 
technological change and falling union membership (Breau and Essletzbichler, 2013). But 
domestic British factors will also have been important. Growth in this period was biased towards 
relatively few sectors and geographically (Stewart, 2011). Evidence from sectoral growth in 
United States cities, for example, shows that growth sectors such as high-technology industries 
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have a positive impact on wages in cities, but that these positive effects only apply for families 
with incomes over 180% of the poverty line (Lee & Rodriguez-Pose, 2016. Instead, the benefits 
of growth fell to high wage earners. This is consistent with national level evidence of growing 
wage inequality in this period, by some measures, driven by inequality towards the top of the 
distribution (Hills et al., 2010).  
 
These results reflect this pattern of growth spatial inequality, with higher wages for workers in 
rapidly growing cities in the South of England, driven by growth in employment and wages at the 
top of the distribution. Yet wages at the bottom of the distribution do not seem to respond in 
the same way, perhaps reflecting growth in the share of low-paid service employment and so 
growing employment polarization, a process noted in all British regions between 1997-2007 
(Jones and Green, 2009). Our results suggest that over this period the wage benefits from growth 
accrued primarily to high earners, with low-earners appearing to derive much less benefit. In this 
respect, they run counter to earlier models which tended to view employment growth and output 
growth as working together. If the benefits of new output are focused on a smaller share of 
workers, this assumption may not hold. 
  
 21 
6. Conclusions 
 
This paper has investigated the relationship between economic growth and poverty in British 
cities. Our central finding is that there was little relationship between economic growth and 
poverty reduction in that period. This result is robust to both a number of different indicators of 
growth and IV estimation. We also find no evidence that urban growth increased the low skilled 
employment rate. Yet, we do find that economic growth is associated with wages growth above 
the median (but not below). Overall, these results suggest a disconnect between economic 
growth and the living standards of those on low incomes. We find little evidence of positive 
wider social impacts or “inclusive growth” (OECD, 2014). 
 
The 2000’s were a period of growing spatial inequality in Britain, with economic growth more 
rapid in London and the cities of the South East than in many of the less affluent cities in the 
rest of the country (Champion & Townsend, 2011; Gardiner et al., 2013). At the same time, there 
were reductions in poverty in many lagging cities. Our analysis adds to this picture by 
demonstrating that the gains of growth tended to accrue to well paid workers at the top of the 
distribution, supporting similar findings at a national level (Lansley & Reed, 2013; Mishel et al., 
2009). One reason for this may be increasingly polarized employment structures in much of the 
Britain. In their analysis of regional employment structures in the decade from 1997, Jones and 
Green (2009) show increasing employment polarization in all mainland regions but particularly in 
London and the South East. Given this growth at the top and bottom of the distribution, our 
finding that growth is associated with growing wage inequality is unsurprising, as patterns of 
employment polarization will be reflected in patterns of wage growth.  
 
Our results have implications for policy and research on inclusive growth. The main implication 
is that greater policy effort is needed to ensure that the labour market benefits of economic 
growth translate into jobs for those at risk of poverty. The policy frameworks which might make 
growth inclusive are not well defined (Turok, 2010), but initiatives might include better job 
matching between new developments and deprived groups, tailored skills provision to help 
residents access new employment opportunities or even selective recruitment by major 
employers. At the same time, our results challenge the view that there will be trickle-down effects 
at a local level from higher wage earners onto the lower skilled labour market – a rising tide does 
not lift all boats, but only those above the median. So rather than assuming that this will happen, 
policymakers could usefully attempt to investigate ways of making it so: this might involve living 
wage campaigns or skills upgrading to improve worker productivity. As cities increasingly focus 
on the notion of inclusive growth (OECD, 2016), new policy frameworks will need to develop. 
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Efforts to make growth inclusive will need to be very different in different places. The advantage 
of a local approach is that the composition of growth – in terms of sectors or job creation – will 
vary, and local actors may be better able to reflect this specificity and develop coalitions between 
different institutions to ensure growth and poverty reduction are linked (Turok, 2010). In cities 
like London, which experienced strong growth but little reduction in aggregate poverty, the focus 
on inclusive growth seems clearly warranted. Given evidence on rising inequality in the city 
(Stewart, 2011) and the continued strong growth, even throughout the crisis, policies around job 
quality, skills, and other labour market initiatives are likely to be appropriate.  
 
Yet the challenge of inclusive growth is twofold. In many cities, simply achieving growth has 
been hard, with inclusion only a secondary aim. Economic growth in the 2000s was highly 
uneven, and this pattern looks to have continued in the early 2010s (Martin et al., 2015). So the 
first step in inclusive growth in some British cities needs to be growth. In this context, it is 
important to caveat the potential of the inclusive growth concept as a way of addressing poverty. 
While cities are increasingly interested in achieving inclusive growth (OECD, 2016) the 
reductions in poverty over the 2000s were largely a result of national actions. Clearly, any local 
level action on poverty reduction needs to be considered alongside ongoing national level efforts. 
 
The paper’s main contribution to the literature is as the first to quantitatively investigate the links 
between economic growth and poverty reduction at the sub-national level in Great Britain. 
However, there are a number of limitations to the evidence presented here. First, there are 
limitations associated with our poverty indicator. In particular we use a proxy measure for 
household poverty. While poverty risk is much higher among benefit claimants (who are 
captured by our measure) there is a growing concern in the Great Britain about in-work poverty, 
at present however there are no survey measures which adequately capture the prevalence of this 
at sub-regional level. For this reason we also assess the impact of growth on the low-wage labour 
market. Secondly, we do not consider the nature of economic growth in great detail, but other 
work suggests this may be important (Goetz et al., 2011). There is therefore scope for future 
work to assess the importance of the factors such as the sectoral composition and physical 
location of growth. 
 
The research opens up a number of potential areas for future research. First, the results here are 
for a specific proxy measure of poverty for a specific period in the British economic history. 
Future work could extend this to investigate robustness to alternative measures of poverty and 
for other countries. For example, there may be some insights from the study of countries such as 
Canada in which productivity did not experience the same disconnect from the median wages 
(Furman, 2014). Second, we only consider nominal income and do not take into account housing 
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costs. In his study of the top 1% of income earners in US cities, Essletzbichler (2015) shows that 
higher living costs reduce any trickle-down benefits they may have on other earners. Similar 
results may apply here, and it is possible that growth would be associated with increased cost of 
living. This is a particular problem in the British housing market where over recent decades 
house price rises have significantly outpaced wage growth (Houston and Sissons, 2012). This is 
an important area for future research, particularly in the context of larger cities such as London – 
with city size being an important potential mitigating factor behind the relationship. Moreover, 
our results are for output growth. Future work may also want to investigate how employment 
growth influences poverty both generally and also according to the sector of employment.  
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Tables 
Table 1. Variables, sources and descriptive statistics 
Variable Source Mean SD 
Households in poverty (%, UMBR Measure) DWP/ONS 0.20 0.06 
GVA per capita growth rate (%) ONS 0.04 0.03 
GVA per worker growth rate (%) ONS 0.05 0.03 
Total GVA growth rate (%) ONS 0.04 0.03 
GVA Per Capita (ln) ONS / ABI -3.65 0.24 
GVA Per Worker (ln) ONS / ABI -3.29 0.15 
Lone parents as % of total population (ln) LFS 1.93 0.26 
Degree holders as % of total population (ln) LFS 2.71 0.36 
Females as % of total population (ln) LFS 3.93 0.01 
Aged under 16 as % of total population (ln) LFS 2.96 0.08 
Born abroad as % of total population (ln) LFS 8.68 5.38 
60 TTWA’s; 480 Observations. Where: LFS = Labour Force Survey, ABI = Annual Business Inquiry, ONS = 
Office of National Statistics, DWP = Department for Work and Pensions.  
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Table 2. Relationship between growth and poverty: Fixed effects panel regressions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 % of households in poverty (UMBR measure)    
           
GVA per capita growth rate (%) -0.00968     -0.0133*     
 (0.00827)     (0.00772)     
GVA per worker growth rate (%)  -0.0206**     -0.0118    
  (0.00857)     (0.00751)    
Total GVA growth rate (%)   -0.0129     -0.0168*   
   (0.00866)     (0.00841)   
GVA per capita (ln)    0.0163     -0.00784  
    (0.0155)     (0.0154)  
GVA per worker (ln)     0.0328**     0.00730 
     (0.0162)     (0.0154) 
Lone Parents as % of total population (ln)      -0.000424 -0.000309 -0.000435 -0.000330 -0.000217 
      (0.00165) (0.00165) (0.00164) (0.00167) (0.00163) 
Degree holders as % of total population 
(ln) 
     -0.00211 -0.00215 -0.00209 -0.00228 -0.00222 
      (0.00230) (0.00228) (0.00230) (0.00232) (0.00225) 
Females as % of total population (ln)      0.512** 0.511** 0.512** 0.546** 0.509** 
      (0.232) (0.231) (0.231) (0.236) (0.232) 
Aged under 16 as % of total population 
(ln) 
     0.169*** 0.163*** 0.169*** 0.167*** 0.162*** 
      (0.0439) (0.0440) (0.0438) (0.0456) (0.0439) 
Born abroad as % of total population (ln)      0.00110 0.000958 0.00112 0.00110 0.000955 
      (0.00158) (0.00158) (0.00157) (0.00155) (0.00159) 
Constant 0.205*** 0.205*** 0.205*** 0.263*** 0.309*** 0.838*** 0.829*** 0.840*** 0.832*** 0.849*** 
 (0.000767) (0.000745) (0.000747) (0.0552) (0.0515) (0.118) (0.118) (0.117) (0.119) (0.119) 
           
Year FE’s Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 480 480 480 480 480 480 480 480 480 480 
R-squared 0.117 0.126 0.119 0.122 0.137 0.350 0.349 0.354 0.346 0.346 
Number of TTWA 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 
Estimated as fixed effects models with robust standard errors (in parentheses). All models include year fixed effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
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Table 3. Instrumental variables estimation  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Outcome variable: % of households in poverty (UMBR measure)  
       
GVA per capita growth rate (%) -0.0882   0.277   
 (0.0584)   (0.957)   
GVA per worker growth rate (%)  -0.0996   -0.0632  
  (0.133)   (0.129)  
Total GVA growth rate (%)   -0.347   -0.0373 
   (2.330)   (0.0468) 
 0.210*** 0.210*** 0.222** 0.798*** 0.745*** 0.795*** 
Constant (0.00238) (0.00474) (0.106) (0.155) (0.166) (0.113) 
 (0.301) (0.00376) (0.00297) (0.162) (0.0943) (0.0636) 
       
Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 480 480 480 480 480 480 
Number of code 60 60 60 60 60 60 
F-stat 748.25 672.72 154.88 78.88 354.24 398.5 
P value of f-stat 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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Table 4. Relationship between growth and the low skilled employment rate  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Outcome variable: Low skilled employment rate (%)     
           
GVA per capita growth rate (%) -8.090     -6.585     
 (4.962)     (4.822)     
GVA per worker growth rate (%)  -4.559     -4.917    
  (5.265)     (5.251)    
Total GVA growth rate (%)   -8.861*     -7.442   
   (5.056)     (5.008)   
GVA per capita (ln)    -1.027     2.443  
    (6.755)     (6.510)  
GVA per worker (ln)     -10.10     -9.608 
     (6.463)     (6.504) 
Lone Parents as % of total population (ln)      -1.649 -1.590 -1.647 -1.566 -1.669 
      (1.082) (1.104) (1.079) (1.083) (1.091) 
Degree holders as % of total population (ln)      -2.026 -2.061 -2.026 -2.171 -2.328* 
      (1.393) (1.417) (1.391) (1.404) (1.389) 
Females as % of total population (ln)      27.00 27.34 27.78 24.62 48.30 
      (73.19) (71.80) (72.94) (71.21) (71.34) 
Aged under 16 as % of total population (ln)      -33.61** -36.09** -33.56** -36.49** -32.58** 
      (14.84) (14.76) (14.78) (14.70) (14.20) 
Born abroad as % of total population (ln)      -1.939** -2.009** -1.935** -2.067** -2.041** 
      (0.801) (0.813) (0.803) (0.802) (0.814) 
Constant 68.83*** 68.66*** 68.90*** 64.59** 33.71 44.80 41.06 45.47 48.07 28.35 
 (0.395) (0.389) (0.413) (25.65) (22.23) (47.92) (48.05) (47.69) (49.91) (47.45) 
           
Year FE’s Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 480 480 480 480 480 480 480 480 480 480 
R-squared 0.238 0.233 0.240 0.231 0.239 0.273 0.270 0.274 0.269 0.274 
Number of TTWA 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 
Estimated as fixed effects models with robust standard errors (in parentheses). All models include year fixed effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
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Table 5. Relationship between growth and wages at different percentiles 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 10th Wage 
percentile 
20th Wage 
percentile 
Median 
wage 
80th Wage 
percentile 
90th Wage 
percentile 
      
Indicator 1:      
GVA per capita growth rate (%) 0.0120 0.0101 0.0455 0.138*** 0.200*** 
 (0.0488) (0.0450) (0.0448) (0.0384) (0.0458) 
Constant 2.919*** 3.409*** 4.442*** 4.908*** 4.372*** 
 (0.520) (0.459) (0.460) (0.530) (0.767) 
R-squared 0.936 0.941 0.939 0.901 0.868 
      
Indicator 2:       
GVA per worker growth rate (%) 0.0784* 0.0571 0.123*** 0.171*** 0.199*** 
 (0.0403) (0.0354) (0.0396) (0.0499) (0.0587) 
Constant 2.981*** 3.454*** 4.538*** 5.040*** 4.524*** 
 (0.517) (0.458) (0.442) (0.513) (0.751) 
R-squared 0.937 0.941 0.940 0.902 0.868 
 
Indicator 3: 
     
Total GVA growth rate (%) 0.00432 0.00282 0.0398 0.125*** 0.193*** 
 (0.0477) (0.0455) (0.0448) (0.0383) (0.0457) 
Constant 2.918*** 3.409*** 4.438*** 4.896*** 4.354*** 
 (0.520) (0.458) (0.461) (0.534) (0.772) 
R-squared 0.936 0.941 0.939 0.901 0.868 
      
Indicator 4:      
Total GVA per capita (ln) 0.0240 0.0135 0.0117 0.189** 0.185** 
 (0.0685) (0.0629) (0.0609) (0.0739) (0.0845) 
Constant 2.949*** 3.426*** 4.456*** 5.145*** 4.602*** 
 (0.532) (0.463) (0.453) (0.507) (0.756) 
R-squared 0.936 0.941 0.939 0.902 0.867 
      
Indicator 5:       
Total GVA per worker (ln) 0.0385 0.0242 0.106* 0.154** 0.212*** 
 (0.0580) (0.0461) (0.0558) (0.0713) (0.0745) 
Constant 2.985*** 3.451*** 4.625*** 5.171*** 4.734*** 
 (0.534) (0.454) (0.493) (0.563) (0.792) 
R-squared 0.936 0.941 0.940 0.901 0.867 
      
Each panel reports the results from fixed effects panel regressions between the five indicators of ‘growth’ and one 
of five percentiles of the wage distribution. Estimated as fixed effects models with robust standard errors (in 
parentheses). All models include year fixed effects. Observations: 480. TTWA: 60. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1        
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Figure 1. Poverty rate in 2001 and change between 2001 – 2008 
            
 
 
